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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STANDARD FOR AVAILABILITY OF PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES IN UTAH IS, AND SHOULD BE, "RECKLESS 
INDIFFERENCE" TOWARDS THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS, 
AND THERE IS MORE THAN AMPLE EVIDENCE OF 
SUCH RECKLESS INDIFFERENCE BY EACH OF THE 
DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE TO HAVE WITHSTOOD A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THAT ISSUE. 
The majority of the defendants' briefs on the issue of 
the standard under which punitive damages may be assessed 
against them involves the argument that the standard is malice 
which is implied from conduct. Evidencing the inherent 
problems with this approach is the complexity and the 
circuitousness of defendants' own argument. Precisely this 
kind of fictionalized standard was rejected by this Court, in a 
false imprisonment context, in McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, 
Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984) ("McFarland"). Such a standard 
would be, quite simply, disingenuous. More significantly, 
however, defendants' argument ignores both the facts and the 
history of this case. 
Judge Fishier ruled in this case that the standard for 
availability of punitive damages in Utah is "actual malice," 
which he defined as having an "intent to injure." Judge 
Fishler's ruling was based, in part, on his express finding 
that McFarland had impliedly overruled Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 
Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983) ("Behrens") , Leigh 
Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
("Leigh Furniture*), and Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 
P.2d 267 (Utah 1982) ('Branch"). Judge Fishier then ruled 
that, as a matter of law, there was no such intent in this 
case. It is only the appropriateness of those rulings with 
which we are concerned on this appeal. Thus, implied malice is 
not at issue. 
Defendants cite a number of Utah Supreme Court cases 
as support for their position that Utah has always required 
"malice, ill will or evil motive11 as a prerequisite for puni-
tive damages awards. These cases all pre-date the Behrens, 
Branch and Leigh Furniture cases, and the majority involved 
findings by the triers of fact that there was in fact malice by 
the defendants in those cases. Subsequently, this Court, along 
with the majority of other courts which have ever considered 
the issue, rejected the argument that malice in fact is 
required before a defendant may be held accountable in punitive 
damages. Even Judge Fishier recognized that the reckless 
indifference standard prevailed under Behrens, Branch and Leigh 
Furniture, but specifically found those cases to have been 
overruled by McFarland. Thus, the decision that there must be 
proof of intent to injure, which is directly contrary to the 
express holding in Behrens, was based entirely upon Judge 
Fishler's belief that such a result was mandated by McFarland. 
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Plaintiffs respectfully submit that Judge Fishier has 
incorrectly and overbroadly interpreted McFarland. The 
inequitable and illogical result of his decision is illustrated 
by the facts of the present case. Contrary to defendants' 
assertions, plaintiffs have offered more than sufficient 
evidence to create issues of fact with respect to each of the 
defendants1 reckless indifference. Those facts were detailed 
in plaintiffs' prior brief, and will not be repeated here. 
Furthermore, and notwithstanding defendant Rogers' 
argument to the contrary, the vast majority of states which 
have considered the issue of punitive damage recovery in the 
context of drunk driving have ruled that punitive damages are 
appropriate in such cases. See Plaintiffs' Appendix to Memo-
randum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. The rationale for this position has been described 
as follows: 
Operation of a motor vehicle after 
voluntary intoxication presents a good 
example of the second general type of 
conduct by a defendant for which punitive 
damages will be sanctioned—conduct which 
the defendant knows, or should have reasoned 
to know, not only creates an unreasonable 
risk of harm but a strong probability that 
the harm will result, yet as to which the 
defendant proceeds in reckless or conscious 
disregard of the consequences. The majority 
of courts have held that driving a motor 
vehicle on a public road after voluntary 
intoxication, by itself, comports with their 
definitions of the type of conduct on the 
part of a defendant which must be found to 
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justify the imposition of punitive damages. 
For example, in Connecticut driving under 
the influence was found to fit the 
characterization of "wanton misconduct"; in 
New York it was found to equate with the 
needed "gross, willful and wanton negli-
gence"; in Oregon the requisite "wanton and 
reckless" conduct was found; and, in 
Pennsylvania driving under the influence was 
found to meet the necessary "outrageous 
conduct done with reckless indifference to 
the interests of others" tests so as to 
justify a punitive award. 
The jurisdictions which view driving 
while intoxicated as itself sufficient to 
warrant the imposition of punitive damages 
place great emphasis on the fact that the 
defendant knew he was consuming a substance 
which would seriously effect [sic] his 
ability to drive safely and that this 
impaired ability posed a clear danger to 
others who the defendant would encounter on 
the highway. Thus, the conscious choice to 
drive after drinking to the point of intoxi-
cation is viewed as sufficient antisocial 
conduct to justify punitive damages. 
(Citations omitted; emphasis added.) 
J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law and Practice 
§ 5.03 (1985). The suggestion that Utah should ignore this 
precedent, and instead adopt a policy which is extremely 
favorable to the drunk driver, is not worthy of extensive 
discussion. This state, through both its courts and its legis-
lature, has always maintained a hard line with respect to the 
social problems that are created by intoxicated operation of 
vehicles. The present case clearly does not warrant any change 
in that well established state policy. 
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In any event, however, the facts of this case are 
sufficient to withstand summary judgment on this issue even in 
those few jurisdictions which have held that "mere evidence of 
intoxication" is not alone sufficient to support a punitive 
damages award* In the present case, defendant Rogers, an 
habitual drinker and drug user, went to a private club with 
friends immediately before he was expected to report to work 
and drive a company vehicle to Park City. At that club, Rogers 
consumed enough drinks to cause the level of alcohol in his 
system to be more than two times the legal level of presumptive 
intoxication. In that state, he proceeded to operate both his 
personal vehicle and the vehicle of his employer on downtown 
Salt Lake City streets. In the course of his operation of 
these vehicles, Rogers1 level of impairment was so great that 
he drove through an intersection, over a curb, onto a sidewalk 
and demolished a number of concrete pillars—thereby causing 
David Johnson's death. Rogers claims that he does not even 
recall these events. In addition, it is not clear, as defen-
dant's counsel suggests, that Rogers did not also run a red 
light. Such conduct cannot, in good conscience, be referred to 
as a "momentary lapse," nor as something that could have 
happened to anyone regardless of their level of intoxication. 
Thus, plaintiffs have offered more than "mere evidence of 
intoxication" in this case. 
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With respect to defendant NAC, there is also suf-
ficient evidence to have withstood a motion for summary judg-
ment on the issue of its reckless indifference. The evidence 
suggests that NAC's hiring, operating and management procedures 
were such as to create a situation which was conducive to 
widespread drinking and drug usage by its nighttime employees. 
There were virtually no practices instituted by NAC which could 
have prevented such conduct. In fact, NAC's employees, includ-
ing Rogers, had essentially unlimited discretion with respect 
to their operation of NAC's vehicles. In addition, there is 
evidence that NAC both knew of and condoned this behavior by 
its employees, thereby making it significantly more likely to 
occur. NAC's attempts, following summary judgment, to deny 
these facts and attack the credibility of the witnesses who 
described them are wholly inappropriate, as plaintiffs are 
entitled to the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences on 
this appeal. See, e.g., Cooke v. Mortensen, 624 P.2d 675 (Utah 
1981) and Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526 
(Utah 1979). 
Plaintiffs did admit in the trial court that they 
could not prove that either Rogers or NAC intended to injure 
David Johnson or his family. However, as the facts here have 
shown, adoption of such a standard would effectively bar 
recovery of punitive damages within the State of Utah. The end 
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result would be that the punishment and deterrent functions 
served by punitive damage awards would be eliminated. This 
result would appear to go far beyond the intent of this Court 
when it decided McFarland, yet this is the result which 
currently prevails in the Third District Court of this State. 
Plaintiffs also admit that punitive damage recovery is 
not appropriate in every automobile accident case. However, 
this is not, as defendants would have this Court believe, an 
"ordinary automobile accident case involving ordinary negligence 
by the defendants. Plaintiffs fully support the defendants' 
suggestion that this Court should actually read the record that 
has been compiled in this case. Even a cursory review of the 
depositions of some of NAC's employees and former employees 
will show that there are triable issues with respect to the 
defendants1 reckless indifference which should have been 
allowed to go to a jury. 
II. THERE WERE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT WHICH 
SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO 
DEFENDANT NAC'S VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Plaintiffs will not reiterate their argument with 
respect to NAC's vicarious liability for punitive damages 
here. However, the gist of that argument is that there is a 
triable issue of fact with respect to NAC's liability for 
punitive damages under any one of the three recognized 
vicarious liability standards, notwithstanding NAC's argument 
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that the evidence is insufficient to support an award under the 
most restrictive approach. Moreover, NAC has again ignored the 
judgment from which plaintiffs have appealed. In fact, Judge 
Fishier ruled that there simply can be no vicarious liability 
for punitive damages in Utah, and that the only way to recover 
punitive damages from a corporation such as NAC is to prove 
that its managerial employees were guilty of conduct which 
resulted in injury and which evidences "actual malice." Thus, 
Judge Fishier rejected every one of the recognized standards of 
vicarious liability, including the most restrictive Restatement 
rule, and defendants1 argument with respect to the sufficiency 
of the evidence under that standard is therefore inappropriate. 
Plaintiffs do take issue with defendants1 somewhat 
misleading statement that the pure vicarious liability rule is 
"clearly the minority point of view." In fact, this standard 
is still the rule in a substantial minority of jurisdictions, 
and was, until very recently, the majority rule. See, 
J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law and Practice 
S§ 5.05 and 5.06 (1985), and supplement thereto. Moreover, 
defendants' suggestion that, as "a singular expression of its 
reasoning," the "some fault" standard should be seen as somehow 
less valid than the New Mexico standard, which also appears to 
be a singular expression of its reasoning, is somewhat 
disingenuous. 
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Finally, some of defendants' arguments essentially 
amount to admissions that issues of fact exist with respect to 
whether or not NAC should be held accountable under any of the 
three standards of vicarious liability. For example, NAC 
argues that it was not reckless in employing or retaining 
Rogers as a driver, since Terry Northrup, Rogers' supervisor, 
stated that he did not know that Rogers had been previously 
convicted of drunk driving in Oregon. Plaintiffs cite the 
Court to the facts that were recited in their opening brief 
which surely create a triable issue with respect to whether or 
not NAC in fact did know of Rogers' difficulties, or at the 
very least, simply avoided obtaining that knowledge. 
The point is that Judge Fishier did not rule that 
plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
satisfy the Restatement, or any other, standard of vicarious 
liability for punitive damages. On the contrary, Judge Fishier 
simply rejected the concept of vicarious liability for punitive 
damages in its entirety. Plaintiffs submit that this was an 
unrealistic ruling which is not in furtherance of the punish-
ment and deterrent policies which this Court has sought to 
further with punitive damage awards generally. Thus, vicarious 
liability for punitive damages will be appropriate under 
certain circumstances, especially where, as here, "compensatory 
damages may be simply absorbed [by NAC] as a cost of doing 
-9-
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business." Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1186. Plaintiffs urge this 
Court to adopt the some fault standard, as the standard which 
is most likely to further the purposes for imposition of 
punitive damages generally, but in any event, to reverse the 
ruling by Judge Fishier that vicarious liability for punitive 
damages simply does not exist in Utah. 
III. PLAINTIFF RAY JOHNSON IS ENTITLED TO MAIN-
TAIN AN ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, SINCE HE WAS BOTH 
INJURED AND WITHIN THE ZONE OF DANGER 
CREATED BY THE ACCIDENT. 
The trial court has ruled in this case that plaintiff 
Ray Johnson is entitled to maintain a cause of action against 
defendants for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
arising out of this accident, expressly on the basis that 
Mr. Johnson was within the "zone of danger" created by Rogers' 
negligent operation of NAC's vehicle. Plaintiffs do not 
contest the ruling that Mrs. Johnson may not recover on her 
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, as she 
was admittedly outside of the zone of danger. However, defen-
dants have appealed Judge Fishler's ruling with respect to 
Mr. Johnson's claim, arguing essentially that this Court has 
ruled clearly that no cause of action for emotional distress 
may be maintained on the basis of negligence in Utah. As 
support for their argument, defendants cite Samms v. Eccles, 11 
Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) and Covert v. Kennecott Copper 
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Corp., 23 Utah 2d 252, 461 P.2d 466 (1969), neither one of 
which may properly be construed in that fashion. 
The Samms case involved a claim for emotional distress 
damages arising out of the defendant's continued sexual 
advances to the plaintiff. This Court simply held that 
recovery of emotional distress damages in such a case would 
only be allowed where the defendant committed an intentional 
-'wrong. The Court did not consider what criteria would apply to 
'/recovery for emotional distress by bystanders at an accident, 
but dealt only with the criteria for recovery by a plaintiff 
"for the direct insult of unwanted sexual advances. Moreover, 
the Samms court specifically limited its holding to situations 
that do not involve physical injury. In fact, the court 
expressed a very progressive attitude with respect to tort 
damage recovery generally, rejecting the theory that a 
possibility of spurious claims should prevent recovery, stating: 
That some claims may be spurious should not 
compel those who administer justice to shut 
their eyes to serious wrongs and let them go 
without being brought to account. It is the 
function of courts and juries to determine 
whether claims are valid or false. 
358 P.2d at 347. 
Similarly, the Covert case does not support the 
proposition for which it has been cited, as it did not involve 
a finding that no cause of action exists for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Rather, in Covert, the court 
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simply found no evidence of negligence which would have been 
sufficient to support such a claim. The implication is that 
such a claim could exist under appropriate facts, since the 
court found that the defendant's conduct in that case amounted 
to no more than "a mistake in judgment in circumstances of 
emergency." 461 P.2d at 469. 
Finally, in a holding which could not be reconciled 
.with defendant's position, this Court has allowed recovery of 
^emotional distress damages under the theory of strict liability 
for nuisance, even where the defendant's conduct was specifi-
cally found to be insufficient to support a cause of action in 
negligence. Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., supra. 
Thus, although this Court has never been presented 
with the issue of bystander recovery of emotional distress 
damages, it does not appear, as defendants suggest, that there 
simply can be no recovery of such damages on the basis of 
negligence. It should be noted that the vast majority of other 
jurisdictions that have considered this issue have allowed 
emotional distress damages to bystanders under certain circum-
stances. The most conservative of those jurisdictions would 
allow recovery where the defendant's conduct also resulted in 
impact on the person that claims emotional distress. See, 
e.g., Ellington v. United States, 404 F.Supp. 1165 (M.D.Fla. 
1975). The Samms case provides support for at least this type 
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of recovery, in that its holding was limited to cases that do 
not involve physical injury. As such, plaintiff Ray Johnson's 
emotional distress should be compensable under both this 
bystander recovery approach, and as a part of his recovery for 
his physical injuries. 
However, Judge Fishier did not so limit his ruling. 
In fact, Judge Fishier adopted the standard which has been 
widely recognized in other jurisdictions, and under which 
recovery is allowed to a bystander where, although there was no 
impact, the plaintiff was within the "zone of danger" created 
by the defendant's conduct and was closely related to the 
injured party. See, e.g., Whetham v. Bismarck Hospital, 197 
N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972) . 
Judge Fishler's adoption of the zone of danger 
standard is supported by substantial precedent from other 
jurisdictions. See, Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 (1970; Supp. 
1985), and cases cited therein. However, the issue of 
bystander recovery for emotional distress has never been 
considered by this Court. The cases which have denied recovery 
of emotional distress damages where the plaintiff's claim was 
based upon negligence have ordinarily done so on the theory 
that the potential for spurious claims in such cases is simply 
too great. The Samms case, involving emotional distress caused 
by unwanted sexual advances, provides a good example of such a 
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claim. However, the zone of danger standard of emotional 
distress recovery has been developed with the intent of 
preventing just such spurious claims. Thus, in order for a 
bystander to recover for emotional distress in a zone of danger 
jurisdiction, he must have been so close to the accident as to 
presumably have had legitimate fear for his own personal 
safety, and in most jurisdictions, must have had a close 
relationship to an injured party as well. 
It would be difficult to imagine a more legitimate 
claim of emotional injury than that which has been made in the 
present case. As he stood on a Salt Lake City street corner 
waiting for a change of light, Ray Johnson's life was abruptly 
and unexpectedly shattered, as his only child was violently 
struck by a truck that was driven by an intoxicated defendant 
Rogers. Shortly thereafter, David Johnson died in his father's 
arms. The unimaginable harm that has been suffered by Ray 
Johnson as a result of these events is directly attributable to 
the defendants' conduct. A clearer case could probably not be 
made for the adoption of the zone of danger standard in this 
jurisdiction, and Judge Fishler's ruling in that regard should 
be affirmed. 
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IV. THE S 31-41-9 THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT FOR 
PERSONAL INJURY LAWSUITS HAS BEEN SATISFIED 
IN THIS ACTION. 
Utah Code Ann. S 31-41-9(1) provides the following 
limitation on personal injury actions arising out of automobile 
accidents: 
No person for whom direct benefit 
coverage is provided for in this Act shall 
be allowed to maintain a cause of action for 
general damages arising out of personal 
injuries alleged to have been caused by an 
automobile accident except where there has 
been caused by this accident any one or more 
of the following: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
Death; 
Dismemberment or fracture; 
Permanent disability; 
Permanent disfigurement; or 
Medical expenses to a person in 
excess of $500.00. (Emphasis 
added). 
NAC has argued that, with respect to plaintiff Ray Johnson's 
general damages claim, this threshold requirement has not been 
met, claiming that Ray Johnson's medical expenses do not exceed 
$500.00. In fact, however, while the expenses that were 
incurred by Ray Johnson in connection with the treatment of his 
foot that was injured in the accident are less than $500.00, 
the total "medical expenses" that were personally incurred by 
Ray Johnson as a direct result of the accident are well in 
excess of $1,000.00. 
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As a direct and proximate result of the accident, Ray 
Johnson received psychiatric medical treatment from a licensed 
medical doctor, Dr. Susan Mirow. That fact is not disputed by 
the defendants. Those medical services cost Ray Johnson 
approximately $1,200.00. See Exhibit A to Deposition of Dr. 
Mirow. Nonetheless, NAC argues that consideration of psychi-
atric medical expenses in establishing the S 31-41-9 threshold 
would be "bootstrapping" past that threshold by inclusion of 
^general damages for emotional distress within the term "medical 
expenses." However, any expenses for Ray Johnson's treatment 
that were actually and necessarily incurred by him as a direct 
and proximate result of the accident are not "general damages," 
but are in fact medical expenses within their ordinary meaning 
and within the meaning of S 31-41-9. Moreover, if there is a 
question as to whether or not these expenses were legitimately 
caused by the accident, it is a question of fact which should 
not have been resolved on a motion for summary judgment. In 
fact, Judge Fishier so ruled when he denied defendants' motion 
on this issue. 
In addition, defendants' argument on this issue 
depends entirely for its validity upon a misinterpretation of 
§ 31-41-9. That statute does not provide, as NAC has alleged, 
that in order for an injured person to maintain a cause of 
action for general damages, that person must personally have 
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suffered medical expenses in excess of $500.00. On the 
contrary, the statute specifically provides that an action for 
general damages can only be maintained if "there has been 
caused by this accident,* any one of a number of criteria, 
including death or medical expenses to "a person" in excess of 
$500.00. Assuming, arguendo, that Ray Johnson's psychiatric 
expenses are not medical expenses for the purposes of this 
statute, there still can be no question but that there was 
caused by the accident which is the subject of Ray Johnson's 
claim, both a death and medical expenses to a person in excess 
of $500.00. Nothing in the statute provides that each and 
every plaintiff must themselves meet the threshold criteria, as 
NAC suggests. On the contrary, the threshold requirement is 
expressly directed at the severity of the "accident," rather 
than at the severity of the injuries that were received by each 
particular plaintiff. Therefore, the threshold requirement of 
S 31-41-9 has been fully satisfied, and Judge Fishler's ruling 
on that issue must be affirmed. 
V. DEFENDANT ROGERS' PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTION 
DOES NOT PRECLUDE PLAINTIFFS FROM RECOVERY 
OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST HIM. 
Defendant Rogers has raised, apparently for the first 
time on this appeal, the issue of whether his criminal punish-
ment should bar plaintiffs' recovery of punitive damages 
against him. The majority of cases in which this issue has 
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been discussed have held that criminal punishment of a defen-
dant for the same conduct which gave rise to the civil suit 
will not bar punitive damage recovery by the civil plaintiff. 
See, J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, Punitive Damages: Law and 
Practice, S 5.33 (1985), and cases cited therein. 
Recently, some states, such as Arizona and Indiana, 
have provided by statute that criminal sanctions do not affect 
civil plaintiffs' recovery of punitive damages. See, Puz v. 
McDonald, 140 Ariz. 77, 680 P.2d 213 (Ct.App. 1984); Gomez v. 
Adams, 462 N.E.2d 212 (Ind.App. 1984). In addition, the 
Supreme Court of Oregon has considered and rejected the 
argument now advanced by defendant Rogers in a thoughtful and 
extensive discussion on the issue: 
It is urged upon us that the purpose of 
punitive damages is identical to that of 
[the criminal code] and that it is unreason-
able to permit punishment for the same act 
in two successive court proceedings where, 
in each instance, the purpose of the punish-
ment is determent of defendant and others 
from like action. 
There is no doubt that in the vast 
majority of jurisdictions in the United 
States the rule is that an action for puni-
tive damages is not affected by previous 
criminal sanctions. In a few states, puni-
tive damages are never allowed, so the 
question does not arise. Of the states that 
do authorize the recovery of punitive 
damages, only a small minority, including 
Indiana and Nebraska, prohibit punitive 
damages where a tort is also a crime. 
* • * 
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We are told that it is "unreasonable" 
to allow double punishment for an act which 
would subject a defendant to both criminal 
and civil sanctions. We see nothing 
unreasonable about it. While there may be 
some judicial antagonism toward the 
proliferation of requests for punitive 
damages in certain civil cases, we do not 
think it reasonable to eliminate punitive 
damages merely because of a prior criminal 
conviction. 
We are unable to understand why the 
additional determent of punitive damages is 
considered unreasonable. Not only the 
criminal justice system but every law 
abiding citizen is concerned with the 
increasing crime rate. If we are concerned 
with the types of acts which may subject a 
defendant to a criminal charge and civil 
liability such as violent crimes against the 
person, as in this case, we see nothing 
wrong with the additional determent of the 
allowance of punitive damages. 
* * * 
We believe there is merit to plain-
tiff's argument that it is in the cases of 
more aggravated wrongful conduct that 
criminal prosecution is apt to occur and to 
adopt the change which defendants urge will 
tend to shield those malefactors to a 
greater extent than those who may have to 
respond in punitive damages because their 
conduct was not so blatantly wrongful as to 
invite the attention of the criminal justice 
system. 
We do not believe the change [in the 
law] for which defendants ask to be either 
just or reasonable. We believe that such a 
change would eliminate a factor which gives 
some aid in the determent of anti-social 
conduct. (Emphasis added; citations 
omitted. ) 
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Roshak v. Leathers, 277 Or. 207, 560 P.2d 275, 277-79 (1977). 
As such, the Oregon court refused to change the rule in that 
jurisdiction that criminal punishment does not affect the 
availability.of punitive damages in civil cases. 
The same rationale is applicable to this case, and the 
same rule should be adopted by this Court, since defendant 
Rogers has similarly failed to offer any reasonable explanation 
why his criminal conviction should relieve him of liability to 
the plaintiffs in this action. In fact, there is evidence in 
this case that, despite the punishment that was meted out by 
the criminal justice system in this case, defendant Rogers has 
not, as he claims, ceased his consumption of alcohol since the 
accident occurred. See Deposition of Richard A. Christensen, 
pp.14-16. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this and Appellants1 
Opening Brief, the Order of the trial court granting partial 
summary judgment to defendants on the issue of punitive damages 
should be reversed, and the Order with respect to plaintiff Ray 
Johnson's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
should be affirmed. 
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